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“The Anti-Equilibrium is not just one item on my publication list. This 
was the most ambitious enterprise of my entire career as a researcher.”
János Kornai (2007: 197)
 “The challenge to equilibrium theory (…) will remain one 
of his most important legacies.”
A. Philip Thirlwall (1987: 316)
1. INTRODUCTION
Is economics conceivable without the concept of equilibrium? In the 1983 Okun 
Lectures, three years before his untimely death, Nicholas Kaldor provocatively 
gave an affirmative answer to this question. Yes, economics is better off without 
equilibrium. This is not a minor issue for some specialists. “Economic theory 
based on the theory of general equilibrium have led to a ‘cul de sac’ which far 
from assisting the absorption of constantly accumulating knowledge and experi-
ence, has inhibited progress and thus created an important brake on the progres-
sive development of economic thought” – he said elsewhere (Kaldor 1983c: 5). 
More than a decade earlier, János Kornai, choosing an even more provocative 
book-title, Anti-Equilibrium (AE for short), had given the same answer. In real 
life, economic actors – households, firms, or national economies – are never in a 
position, which can be meaningfully called “equilibrium”; they act under bind-
ing demand or resource constraints. Capitalist economies are inherently demand-
constrained, while the socialist ones are resource-constrained. This is the take-
home message of Kornai’s several works since 1971. With their congruent views, 
nonetheless, these two great scholars remained in the minority camp until today. 
The mainstream of the economic profession still holds that only the neoclassical 
paradigm offers a comprehensive, systematic, consistent, and above all math-
ematical (hence “scientific”) description of how modern economies operate. 
“Wherever economics is used or thought about, equilibrium is a central organ-
ising idea” – this was the opening sentence of Frank Hahn’s Inaugural lecture at 
Cambridge University in 1973. He, who certainly knew the works and the views 
of both Kaldor1 and Kornai very well at that point of time, did not want to say 
anything upsetting. He simply stated what was obvious for him and for the ma-
jority of his audience. In the lecture, he directly criticised Kaldor (1972) at great 
length, and then in a separate paper (Hahn 1973b) entirely devoted to the review 
of AE, he essentially rejected Kornai’s standpoint as well. Interestingly, decades 
later Hahn was more permissive – but that was too late for Kaldor or for Kornai as 
1 Kaldor was Hahn’s PhD supervisor at the LSE in the late 1940s.
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an excuse or compensation. This is what Hahn said in a 2005 interview: “Kaldor 
of course was criticising very heavily people like me and so on for building cas-
tles in the air, or that we were making science fiction. There is something true in 
it, but at least we built something” (Basili – Zappia 2005: 17).
The cradle of the General Equilibrium Theory (GET) had been rocked by math-
ematicians and/or by theoretical economists with very strong inclination to think 
in mathematical models. This happened in the early 1950s, more than six decades 
ago. The key protagonists were Arrow and Debreu. What is less often considered 
is the biographical fact that in the year when the Arrow – Debreu (1954) paper 
was published by the American-born Kenneth J. Arrow, who taught economics 
at Stanford, and by the French-born mathematician, Gerard Debreu, who at that 
time worked at the Cowles Commission in Chicago, they were both 33 years of 
age. Both young men were at the beginning of the meteoric rise of their careers 
that culminated with the Nobel Memorial Prize in 1972 and 1983, respectively.
Among the founding fathers of GET, the name of Lionel McKenzie also 
needs to be mentioned. He was 35 years old, when his first major contribution 
(McKenzie 1954) was published, a month before the Arrow – Debreu (1954) 
paper. 2 At the time, McKenzie was a student of the Dutch-American professor, 
Tjalling Koopmans, another GET icon, but his paper was to a large extent in-
spired by another Hungarian-born scholar, John von Neumann’s German lan-
guage manuscript, written in 1932.3 
Since the onset of the 2008 international financial crisis, the criticism of GET, 
the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) modelling approach based 
on it, and in fact, the entire body of the neoclassical paradigm has become louder 
and more widely shared.4 In retrospect, it is also clear that strong declarations 
of the same nature had already been formulated a decade earlier by prominent 
representatives of the profession. Let us illustrate this claim with the examples 
of two Americans, whose words are quoted from a 530-page monograph entirely 
devoted to the criticism of Traditional Economics, as one author labelled the neo-
classical synthesis (Beinhocker 2007). The first quote is from Joseph Stiglitz, the 
Nobel Prize winner of 2001, speaking publicly in the middle of the 1990s: “Any-
2  If we want to be very precise with the dates, it is worth mentioning that both the Arrow – 
Debreu (1954) paper and the McKenzie (1954) paper had been publicly presented already at 
the Chicago Econometric Society meeting in December 1952. On the still sensitive issue of 
scientific priority between Arrow and Debreu on the one hand and McKenzie on the other, see 
Weintraub (2011).
3 For a detailed discussion of von Neumann’s contribution to GET, see Zalai (2004).
4  See, e.g., the debates among experts within the European Union, succinctly summarised in 
Kirman’s (2010) oft-cited paper. From the more recent assessments, see Blanchard (2016) and 
Krugman (2016).
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body looking at these models would say they can’t provide a good description of 
the modern world” (p. 22). The second quote is from Alan Greenspan, writing in 
the early 2000s: “We really don’t know how the economy works… The old mod-
els just are not working” (ibid.). In fact, this circle can be broadened. A thorough 
analysis of the Nobel Prize Lectures of all economists showed that 8 laureates 
– Hayek, Simon, Solow, Havelmo, Coase, North, Sen, and Kahneman – emphati-
cally stated in their addresses that the neoclassical theory was actually wrong, in 
whole or in part, on either empirical or theoretical grounds. All of them said that 
the theory could not be true (Offer – Söderberg 2016: 65). 
This paper does not intend to deliver justice to any of the schools, either the 
GET supporters or those who think that – using one of Kaldor’s formulation 
– economic theory works better without the equilibrium approach. Our modest 
objective in the remaining part of the paper is to attempt to solve a small mystery. 
We shall try to show why these two prolific writers, Kaldor and Kornai, who 
were friends and spoke the same mother tongue did not find a common ground 
and did not even try to build a school of followers jointly. The other part of the 
question, namely why GET has remained practically an unchallenged concept for 
99 per cent of lecturers teaching in economics departments until today, will not 
be touched upon in the present paper.
Before we start our comparative analysis, one important caveat seems in order. 
Almost everything that we shall quote from Kaldor or Kornai was formulated in 
the 1970s and 1980s as a critique of works authored in the 1950s.5 Since then, 
equilibrium models developed in several directions and some of the criticism 
expressed by our main protagonists has been already incorporated into the newer 
models (e.g. the role of government, taxation, fiscal and monetary policies). 
2.  INTERACTIONS
Kaldor and Kornai met in Cambridge in July 1963 on the occasion of a round-
table conference of the International Economic Association, where Kornai de-
livered a talk in German6 on long-term planning in Hungary – his main research 
5  In this regard, it is worth quoting Kaldor’s hardly known Joan Robinson Lecture, in which he 
touched upon the issue of timeliness in a very opinionated language: “the theory of general 
competitive equilibrium attained its present ’mature shape’ by 1954; since then nothing of any 
importance, so I understand, has been added to it” Kaldor (1983c: 2). 
6  At that time, Kornai still did not possess a sufficiently secure command of the English lan-
guage. Interestingly, English was only the third language of all the great Hungarian-born econ-
omists mentioned in this paper, namely for Thomas Balogh, Nicholas Kaldor, Janos Kornai, 
John von Neumann, and Tibor Scitovsky (after Hungarian and German).
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topic at that time. When they met, Kornai also happened to be 33, like Arrow 
and Debreu when they authored the seminal paper of GET, though Kornai was 
somewhat older (39) when he completed the first draft of Anti-Equilibrium in 
1967. The final version of AE, approximately twice as long as the 1967 draft, was 
published simultaneously in Hungarian and in English in 1971, when Kornai was 
already 43. 
Kaldor was almost a generation older, 55 years of age in 1963. When they 
met for the first time, they were both already beyond a fundamental change in 
their worldview (Weltanschauung). Kornai used to be a Marxist; Kaldor had been 
trained on neoclassical models. But they fundamentally changed their way of 
thinking as they entered the fourth decade of their lives, as if they wanted to con-
firm Keynes’s famous dictum on the very last page of The General Theory, that 
only very few people “can be influenced by new theories after they are twenty-
five or thirty years of age” (op.cit.: 384) – most scholars never leave the doc-
trine they were trained in. But these two did. When they first met in Cambridge, 
Kornai must have already known the name of Nicholas Kaldor, as a prominent 
Hungarian-born economist living in England. Kaldor’s name was well known in 
politically well-versed circles in Budapest after World War II, since Kaldor had 
helped the Hungarian Social Democratic Party with his economic advice for a 
short time.7 However, as far as we can establish from Kornai’s entire oeuvre, he 
was not familiar with any of Kaldor’s pre-1970 writings on the subject matter of 
the present paper. 
This is not surprising. First, in the 1950s and 1960s, Kornai lived in Hun-
gary, very far from the cross-border scholarly flows of information. Secondly, 
Kaldor’s first papers attacking the neoclassical paradigm – apart from one excep-
tion, namely Kaldor (1966) – were all published in the later 1930s, when Kornai 
was still a child. Kaldor returned to this subject with full strength and firepower 
only after the publication of Anti-Equilibrium. In any case, Kaldor was not listed 
in the name index of the published version of AE, and none of his writings were 
cited among the 286 references.
After their first personal encounter, Kaldor and Kornai remained close personal 
and family friends during the next 25 years. They frequently met in England and 
in Hungary, but they did not become comrades-in-arms in the bitterly competitive 
sports arena of the international scientific world in spite of the fact that the intel-
lectual fight against GET was vitally important for both men. 
 The research and publication strategies of the two men were different. Kaldor 
never wrote a full-length book, most of his works, including the ones relevant 
7  For a detailed analysis of Kaldor’s activity in Hungary, see Mommen’s (2017) paper in the 
present issue. 
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for the present paper, came to light in the form of guest lectures and/or academic 
papers for scholarly journals. By contrast, Kornai’s main form of self-expression 
was writing voluminous monographs, like Anti-Equilibrium itself, Economics of 
Shortage (1980), The Socialist System (1992), and his more recent book, Dyna-
mism, Rivalry and the Surplus Economy (2014). Table 1 above gives an overview 
of the most important writings of the two authors from the perspective of our 
subject. 
In AE, Kornai gave a list of 12 points in a tabulated form with detailed ex-
planations (Table 2). In Kaldor’s various writings, many of these points were 
discussed or at least mentioned at greater or shorter length, but never in such a 
systematic way. For example, in Kaldor (1934a), where the term “cobweb theo-
rem” was first coined in the literature in the context of emphasising the impor-
tance of changing expectations in the prevention of reaching a static equilibrium 
of certain markets, the neoclassical theory was labelled exactly in the same way 
(“static theory”). The “lack of uncertainty” was criticised in Kaldor (1966). In 
Kornai’s line of reasoning, the GET model’s simplification to limit the actors to 
producers or consumers was contrary to everyday reality. Writing on the same is-
sue, Kaldor discussed at length in many instances the importance of traders, mid-
dle men – rather than accepting the simple view according to which producers 
and consumers meet on markets in the form of “direct exchange” (first in Kaldor 
1934a, later in Kaldor 1983c). 
Table 1. The most important publications of Kaldor and Kornai challenging GET
Kaldor Kornai
Marginal Productivity and Macroeconomic 
Theories of Distribution (Polemics with 
Samuelson and Modigliani, 1966)
Anti-Equilibrium (An Essay), (1967 Hungarian, 
1968 English) – Mimeo.
The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics 
(Goodricke Lecture, May 1972) #
Anti-Equilibrium (1971)
Equilibrium Theory and Growth Theory 
(Barcelona lecture, April 1973) # 
Kornai – Martos (1973)
What is Wrong with Economic Theory 
(Harvard lecture, April 1974)
Resource-Constrained versus Demand-
Constrained Systems (1979)
Limitations of the General Theory (1982) # Economics of Shortage (1980) +
Economics without Equilibrium 
(Okun Lectures, October 1983) #
The Socialist System (1992)
The Futility of General Equilibrium Theory 
(Joan Robinson Memorial Lecture at Harvard, 
October 28, 1983) #
Against the Mainstream. Ch. 10 in By Force of 
Thought (Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual 
Journey) (2007) +
Recollections of an Economist (1986) # Dynamism, Rivalry and the Surplus Economy 
(2014) +
Notes: # Reference to Kornai; + Reference to Kaldor. 
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Kaldor, as we already noted, never put together a monograph, in which all his 
criticism against GET can be found. In order to reconstruct his views, we had to 
assemble his “12 point list” ourselves.8 As far as we can judge, there are only two 
points in Kornai’s list (nos 4 and 10), where one can securely document that in his 
later works, Kaldor directly relied on Anti-Equilibrium and Kornai’s underlying 
theoretical construct. It is particularly important to underline, as it was already 
shown in Table 1, that in many of his writings, Kaldor cited Kornai’s most origi-
nal assertion, namely that much regulation takes place in all market economies 
based on quantity signals, rather than on price signals, as the neoclassical model 
presupposes.9 In Kaldor (1983c) one can find a long paragraph, praising Kornai 
(1971) for his concept of “vegetative control” that helps greatly to understand 
how a rise or fall in inventories automatically and instantly activate reactions 
from producers even, if there are no price changes at that moment. On other, 
8  The list by Thirlwall (1987: 319), Kaldor’s biographer, is a good starting point. In Kaldor 
(1973), we found 7 such points listed.
9  Unfortunately, the correct references of Kaldor to Kornai’s precedence in understanding the 
importance of quantity signals do not prevent the generation of young researchers to attribute 
this particular idea entirely to Kaldor, rather than to Kornai (see, e.g., Chappe 2016). Kornai 
had really bad luck with Arrow as well. While it is true that in his Nobel Prize lecture, Ar-
row (1972) cited Kornai’s (1971) work in the main text on the very same point (notably the 
importance of quantity signals), his name and the bibliographic reference to it was left out of 
the reference list by mistake. True, the name of Kaldor was not even mentioned in the Nobel 
lecture. 
Table 2. The “self-evident postulates” of GET according to Kornai
1 Static/stationary character
2 The set of organisations is given
3 Agents: producers and consumers only
4 Set of products is given
5 Simultaneous operation
6 Set of production is convex
7 Profit maximisation
8 Consumer utility maximisation
9 Set of production and consumption and preference ordering are given
10 Only price information provides incentives
11 Anonymous relations on all markets
12 Lack of uncertainty
Source: Kornai (1971: Table 3.1).
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related issues, Kaldor’s sporadic comments were formulated with a similar inten-
tion, but in a less precise way – if compared to AE.
In closing, it is important to underline that Kaldor’s most elaborate and detailed 
acknowledgement of Kornai’s achievements in questioning the fundamentals of 
GET was presented in the so-called Joan Robinson lecture at Harvard (Kaldor 
1983c). Regrettably, this talk was not published subsequently – as was gener-
ally the case with similar lectures.10 In fact, the Robinson lecture is unique in the 
entire anti-equilibrium literature by acknowledging the importance of quantity 
signals in the Western-type, decentralised market economies. In the way Kaldor 
referred to and interpreted Kornai’s ideas in AE, it is clear that he considered this 
approach as a possible avenue to develop an empirically testable microeconomic 
foundation for the Keynesian macro-model. 
3. TWO LIFE COURSES
Kaldor started his economic education as a favourite student of Robbins and 
Hayek at the LSE in 1927. However, within a relatively short time, he became 
disillusioned with the neoclassical approach, or what his fellow Hungarian-born 
economist, Thomas Balogh later used to call “the restricted view” (Balogh 1982: 
1). Shaping his mind, the then Head of the Economics Department, Allyn Young 
exerted the biggest impact on him. In Kaldor’s own words, Young’s (1928) paper 
convinced him that “the main function of markets is to transmit impulses to eco-
nomic change, and thereby create more resources through enlarging the scope for 
specialisation and the division of labour – rather than to secure an optimum al-
location of a given quantum of resources” (Kaldor 1978, italics in the original), as 
the traditional school claimed in line with the Walrasian approach. Subsequently, 
already as a member of the LSE faculty, he produced six essays between 1934 
and 1938 on the determinateness of static equilibrium, the full implications of 
equilibrium for a model firm, the imperfect/monopolistic competition, and the 
notion of excess capacity. All this happened many years before the birth of the 
Arrow – Debreu (1954) paper.
Thus, Kaldor was intellectually relieved in 1949, when the opportunity came 
for him to move from the neoclassical world of LSE to Cambridge and resume 
the academic path after he had spent some years at the United Nations Economic 
10  Most probably, the editors of Kaldor’s collected works assumed that the Okun lectures, de-
livered at about the same time at Yale and reprinted two years later, contained everything that 
Kaldor had to say about “economics without equilibrium”. The typewritten text of Kaldor’s 
Robinson lecture has been preserved in the Kings’ College Archive (Cambridge, UK). 
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Commission in Geneva. Henceforth, he became a member of what Joan Robin-
son called the Cambridge Anglo-Italian school, where at least half of the Faculty 
of Economics were deeply sceptical about GET, the Samuelsonian synthesis of 
Keynesianism and the neoclassical tradition. Most of them went even further 
than Keynes himself in the search for a “dynamic theory of economics”.11 As we 
already noted above, timewise Kaldor was the first to go public with a system-
atic critique of the use of the equilibrium concept. As compared to the pre-war 
decades , Kaldor’s research has become much more policy oriented. He tried to 
find an answer to such “mundane” questions like why capitalist economies per-
form differently, what is wrong with the growth rate of the British economy, 
should Britain join the Common Market, etc. The neoclassical equilibrium ap-
proach and GET were too abstract to help him in all this.
János Kornai lived and worked exclusively in Hungary until he accepted the 
first longer teaching position at Princeton in 1972. During the years when he 
worked on AE, he was isolated from similar minded Western scholars.12 He did 
have younger co-workers both from Hungary and other countries, but he was the 
helper and not the one who got (intellectual) help. In fact, the word “isolation” is 
an exaggeration. In 1968, Kornai spent four months with Arrow at Stanford and 
in 1970, a stipend allowed him to stay 6 months with Koopmans13 at Yale. Both 
giants read AE (Arrow the English translation of the 1967 draft14, Koopmans the 
manuscript of the final version) and they both helped him generously with com-
ments, corrections, and suggestions. In his memoir, Kornai (2007: 178) quoted 
Arrow’s self-ironical remark on AE after reading it: “It will make a fine obelisk 
on the burial mound of the general equilibrium theory”. 
Similarly, to Kaldor, Kornai was not so much a model-builder. He was more 
interested in “mundane” research questions such as what is wrong with central-
ised planning systems? If they are plainly dysfunctional, how do they function at 
all? What is the reason of the endemic shortages? Why is the socialist planning 
system incapable of meeting the quality standards of Western market economies? 
11  Kaldor’s expression is quoted in Levi (1973: 206). Besides Kaldor, Joan Robinson was prob-
ably the most prolific critical writer on the subject of equilibrium among the Cambridge econ-
omists (see, e.g., Harris 2005). 
12  Strangely enough, there is no documented evidence in Kornai’s writings on the approximate 
date, when he started to work on the criticism of GET. What is certain: he did not have any 
publication on GET before 1967 – not even in Hungarian. Like the vast majority of his aca-
demic output, the 200-page long manuscript from 1967, which elaborated all the basic ideas 
of the book, had been drafted first in Hungarian and distributed in mimeo form. 
13  Kornai was particularly impressed by two pieces among Tjalling Koopmans’ writings: Koop-
mans (1957) and Koopmans – Montias (1971). In Kaldor (1972: 196–201), there is also a long 
section acknowledging the contributions of Koopmans to the equilibrium discussion. 
14 See Kornai (1968).
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Why is the planned economy unable to produce world-shattering innovations? 
Like Kaldor, Kornai also thought that the equilibrium approach would not help 
him to answer these questions.
4. SHARED CONCLUSIONS AND POINTS OF DISAGREEMENTS
In one of Kaldor’s many directly polemic writings, he used the following meta-
phor to characterise the misleading trick of the equilibrium approach. The as-
sumptions of the neoclassical economists are promised to function like scaffold-
ing that can be removed once the new building is ready. “In fact, these props are 
never removed; the removal of any one of a number of them – as, for example, al-
lowing increasing returns or learning-by-doing – is sufficient to cause the whole 
structure to collapse like a pack of cards. It is high time that the brilliant minds 
of M.I.T. were set to evolve a system of non-Euclidean economics which starts 
from a non-perfect, non-profit-maximising economy where such abstractions are 
initially unnecessary” (Kaldor 1966, 1978: 83). This resonates closely with sen-
tences from the final pages of AE: “Now is the time to begin the synthesis on 
bases that are broader than general equilibrium theory and more in agreements 
with facts. (…) An indefinitely long queue of wrong models will still not con-
verge to a good model” (op. cit.: 376, 382). 
Kornai had two strong metaphors in AE. According to the first one, GET is 
merely a thought experiment. The other cited metaphor was borrowed from He-
isenberg, i.e. from the world of physics: “A closed system cannot be improved 
(…) it is a mathematical crystal” (op.cit.: Section 25.2). Kaldor must have liked 
both metaphors too, because he used them repeatedly in his later writings. 
Beyond the above-quoted, commonly shared telling metaphors, the common 
understanding of Kaldor and Kornai pertaining to the shortcomings and the use-
lessness of GET can be summarised in 8 points. 
1.  Biology is better suited than physics as a reference model for economic the-
ory. This conviction was later re-established in the Nobel lectures of such 
divergent personalities as Friedrich Hayek (1974) and Herbert Simon (1978) 
(Offer – Söderberg 2016: 61–62). 
2.  It is a mistake to search for a single point of weakness in GET. The problems 
are numerous and mutually intertwined. Kornai was quite explicit, when he 
identified 12 such points in AE. 
3.  Perfect competition is a myth. In a capitalist market economy, markets are oli-
gopolistic; the majority of sellers set their own price. In other words, firms – 
especially the large and very large firms that generate technical progress – are 
ECONOMICS WITHOUT EQUILIBRIUM 57
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
price makers.15 As for empirics, both Kaldor and Kornai relied on Galbraith’s 
(1967) seminal work. 
4.  The most important feature of the capitalist system is its dynamic nature. This 
dynamism, in turn, is generated and driven by social and political forces, in-
cluding the system-inherent ideologies. GET is an attempt to emasculate the 
system by assuming that (i) given exogenous variables are immutable in time; 
and (ii) only quantities and prices matter. 
5.  It is mistaken to assume that supply and demand curves represent unequivo-
cally independent combinations. They mutually codetermine each other with-
out crossing each other in one and only one equilibrium point.16
6.  Increasing returns to scale is one of the most important drivers of economic 
development. This cannot be left out from the theory in the name of mathe-
matical convenience and/or the assumption that it in real life is incompatible 
with perfect competition.17 
7.  Markets are never in Walrasian equilibrium, they always display asymmetry in 
one way or another. The capitalist economy is always demand-constrained.
8.  According to the mainstream textbooks, when all markets are in equilibrium, 
this point is Pareto optimal for all economic agents at the micro-level and thus 
at macroeconomic level as well. By contrast, both Kaldor and Kornai stressed 
that at the micro-level, the adjustment process never stops. In addition, Kornai 
forcefully avows that the equilibrium position at the macro-level is system 
specific: excess supply in the capitalist system, excess demand (shortages) in 
the socialist system.
The regrettable fact is that Kaldor and Kornai did not have the opportunity 
to work together in a common physical space18 and their personal encounters 
15  It is noteworthy that the dual concept of price-taker vs. price-maker was first coined by an-
other Hungarian-born economist, Tibor Scitovsky (1951), whose works were often quoted by 
both Kaldor and Kornai. 
16  In Kaldor’s oeuvre, this idea was first launched in the context of the Cobweb Theorem, as 
already mentioned. In this model, the quantity produced depends on the price anticipated at 
the time of the sale and where supply at time of the sale determines the actual market price 
(Kaldor 1934).
17  In a 1961 letter to Kaldor, Solow defended the disregard of increasing returns to scale with 
the following two arguments: “the assumption of constant returns to scale is convenient for 
two reasons: mathematically, because it simplifies calculation, economically because without 
it competition runs into difficulties and competitive systems are the easiest to deal with”. 
Quoted by Thirlwall (1987: 320).
18  Actually, Kornai did receive an invitation to a permanent teaching position in Cambridge at 
the Faculty of Economics from Richard Stone in 1963, i.e. before writing AE. He rejected this 
magnificent opportunity precisely because a permanent position was on offer. Kornai did not 
want to emigrate. On this chapter of his life, see Kornai (2007).
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were not so frequent that they could easily exchange views on broad and com-
plex issues of economic theory. Neither did the internet, blogs, e-mails, or Skype 
exist , which could have helped them in bridging the distance between Cambridge 
and Budapest. Thus, it is no wonder that in a large number of areas, our two 
heroes represented divergent views and most probably never had the chance to 
thoroughly debate them. 
1.  Kaldor (as well as Thomas Balogh) entirely rejected the concept of production 
function and the marginal productivity theory of distribution19 that is based 
on it. Kaldor’s theoretical standpoint was quite clear on income distribution. 
Wages and profits are the result of country-level bargaining (chiefly because 
of the uniquely strong power of the British trade unions at that time); they are 
not determined by technology. Kornai has never directly questioned the model 
family of different production functions and the marginal productivity theory 
of distribution. His occasional comments were rather neutral towards these 
two crucial tenets of neoclassical, mainstream economics. 
2.  Kornai’s criticism is centred on GET’s two core concepts: preferences and 
utilities. Kaldor never really questioned their usefulness. 
3.  Kaldor, echoing Leontief’s (1971) and Balogh’s (1982) harsh sentences, had 
strong reservations vis-à-vis the irresponsible use of mathematics, or mathi-
ness, as it is called today (Roamer 2015). Kornai respected and used math-
ematics as much as the circumstances allowed him.
4.  Kaldor honestly believed that the “existing” capitalist system can be reformed, 
after which it would function better and in a more rightful way.20 In the frame-
work of Kornai’s system paradigm, the essential features of the capitalist mar-
ket economy cannot be changed without losing some of its intrinsic positive 
characteristics. He had strong reservations vis-à-vis the naive reformers of 
both systems. In the eyes of Kornai, Kaldor was a naïve reformer by believ-
ing that “the assumption of ever greater powers of control by the State”21 and 
within this, wisely designed employment and income policies can eliminate 
unemployment and inequalities. For Kornai, a capitalist economy worthy to 
its name is always a surplus economy, with substantial, idle excess capacities; 
a large portion of unsold goods held in the form of output stock and a rela-
tively large underutilised labour force. 
5.  Kaldor was a social democrat, a planning Keynesian22 and salaried adviser 
of British Labour Prime Ministers. Furthermore, he served as a United Na-
19 See, e.g., Kaldor’s own Introduction to Kaldor (1960).
20 See the introductory study of Gabor Oblath to Kaldor (1989).
21 These are Kaldor’s own words, quoted by Levi (1973: 208).
22 A term coined by Balogh (1983: 4).
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tions civil servant, and later as an economic advisor of several foreign gov-
ernments. Kornai was a communist at the beginning of his career, but already 
became a liberal in 1956. He never assumed any political or foreign advisory 
function later on.23 There is more behind this difference than simply personal 
taste or dissimilar political systems in which the two men worked. Kaldor 
had no problem with the existence of social welfare functions based on the 
mechanism of social compensation. If there is a welfare enhancing economic 
proposition, winners of the proposed change can always over-compensate the 
losers. Kornai did not accept this logic for a number of scholarly reasons (as 
explained at some length in Kornai 2002). 
5. UNEXPLOITED ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As the communist shortage economies ceased to exist after 1990, and thus vir-
tually all developed economies have become demand-constrained, a new situa-
tion emerged for theoretical economics and model building. In our opinion, there 
are several valuable points in the anti-equilibrium legacy of our two heroes that 
might lead to new insights in the understanding of decentralised systems based 
on private ownership. 
As a student of Allyn Young, Kaldor was deeply convinced from the 1930s 
onwards that increasing returns arising from, inter alia, the indivisibility of many 
types of physical capital was essential only in the manufacturing sector. He be-
lieved that other sectors such as agriculture and the service sectors resembled 
more the textbook constant returns to scale model. This assertion is unlikely to 
hold in our times. Thus, it would be an interesting research subject, if anyone 
tried to quantify such differences, if they exist at all, in the primary, secondary, 
and tertiary sectors of the economy. On several occasions, but in Kaldor (1975a) 
with a strong emphasis, Kaldor opined that complementarity of K and L is more 
important than the substitution between K and L, as the traditional neoclassi-
cal approach postulated. “(T)the concentration on the substitution aspect which 
makes ‘pure’ equilibrium theory so lifeless and motionless” (Kaldor 1975, 1989: 
400–401). In our opinion, one of the shortcomings of developmental aid policies 
pursued in the second half of the 20th century is rooted exactly here. The Harrod-
Domar model, for example, assumed that if a poor country lacks capital, this 
could be compensated by the use of extra amount of labour – which was abun-
23  Nevertheless, it would be misleading to believe that Kornai lived in the ivory tower of acad-
emy after 1956. E.g., he was a member of the Hungarian central bank’s Monetary Council 
between 1998 and 2001. 
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dant anyway. The Solow model is built on the same erroneous assumption, too. 
The real difficulty in accelerating the development of any country can perhaps 
be best illustrated by a metaphor proposed by an internationally barely known 
Hungarian economist, Ferenc Jánossy (1966). In his seminal book on growth 
theory, he stated that “machine is the teacher of the worker”, by which he simply 
wanted to say that workers could learn turning only on a turning-lathe or, in a 
more general sense, the accumulation of human capital goes hand-in-hand with 
the accumulation of physical capital.
As already underscored in the previous section, the critique of the concept of 
the aggregate production function was a central issue for Kaldor throughout his 
academic life. In this context, it is important to note that Robert Solow (2015) 
recently acknowledged in a conference talk24 and later in a short article that “what 
we measure as wages and profits both contain an element of rent. (…) What hap-
pens to it now [in the automobile manufacturing companies of Detroit – P. M.] is 
not so much a matter of economic law. It depends on bargaining power, business 
attitudes and practices, social norms and public opinion.” In other words, wages 
and profits are essentially social constructs; they are not determined by a given 
level of technology as the Cobb-Douglas function, the Solow model, and their 
later versions contend. This is exactly what Kaldor (and Ricardo before him) had 
said all along. 
At the end of his life, Kaldor managed to find a succinct form of identifying 
the fundamental limitation of Keynes’s General Theory – a point with which 
Kornai would probably have fully agreed with, although he himself never wrote 
anything critical against Keynes. In Kaldor (1983b), we can find the following 
line of argument: If production was to be constrained by demand – as the grand 
oeuvre claimed in 1936 – there must be excess capacity. But the notion of excess 
capacity is not consistent with perfect competition, i.e. with the Marshallian tra-
dition with which Keynes himself showed solidarity throughout his life. With a 
little dose of exaggeration, we may say that under this criticism the Keynesian 
innovation – and the neoclassical micro+macro synthesis built upon it – is col-
lapsing like a house of cards.
From the anti-equilibrium legacy of János Kornai, three building blocks seem 
to be underutilised at present. Firstly, his tertium non datur proposition should 
be mentioned. In the dimension of politics, there is no third way. Democracy and 
economic decentralisation are the two sides of the same coin; just as dictatorship 
and centralisation also go hand-in-hand most of the time in most of the countries. 
Secondly, Kornai has forcefully argued since the 1970s, and still does so in his 
most recent writings (Kornai 2014, 2016) that the dynamism of the capitalist 
24 See the personal account of one participant, Milanovic (2015). 
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economy is the result of inter-firm rivalry, which is not hampered at all by the 
oligopolistic nature of markets, as the textbook version of the GET conveys to 
students. The absence of perfect completion is not damaging, but rather virtuous 
for technical progress. It allows the most efficient firms – not only in manu-
facturing, but also in the service sector – to harness higher-than-average profits 
through arbitrarily large mark-ups, or using a different terminology: exploiting a 
scarcity rent (Mihalyi – Szelényi 2016). Usually there are two interrelated factors 
behind this: pioneering technology and economy of scale arising from the con-
centration of firms at the national or the international level (e.g. through mergers 
and acquisitions). In fact, both of these factors play a crucial role in generating 
revolutionary (Schumpeterian) innovations. While this generalisation may sound 
idiosyncratic for many economists raised on neoclassical equilibrium models, it 
is a commonplace in the management science literature to say that many impor-
tant industries never have more than three significant competitors.25 The same 
trend in the literature also claims that in many markets the shares of the three 
leading companies reach a ratio of approximately 4:2:1, i.e. there is a significant 
market share difference even among the top firms. Data from US Census Bureau 
also supports this claim. In 2012, the top four US firms’ average share of total 
revenue on a sector-by-sector basis was close to 50% in IT, telecoms and media 
sector, 40% in retail trade, and almost 40% in the finance and insurance sector.26 
In our view, the third enormously valuable, but still underutilised proposition 
of Kornai is the partition of decisions of economic agents into two sub-groups. 
This idea was already present in AE,27 but Kornai returned to it many times later, 
including in his memoirs where he adapted his idea to analyse many of his person-
al decisions. In the GET model, all decisions are motivated by the same driving 
force and their implementations are all similar. Producers are maximising profits, 
consumers maximise their utilities. Both groups of actors are characterised by 
perfect foresight and lack of uncertainty. In contrast, Kornai contends that human 
decision-making is inherently different when it comes to recurrent and compara-
ble choices on the one hand, and non-recurring and non-comparable choices on 
the other. In fact, it is trivial to agree on this distinction.
Quite clearly, when housewives do their daily shopping in a fruit market, they 
routinely compare prices and qualities before they buy apples from a particular 
25  This finding was first demonstrated by the founder of the Boston Consulting Group, Bruce 
Henderson (1976), and then later re-confirmed empirically on a much larger data set by 
Reeves et al. (2012). Since then, successful companies such as General Electric and others 
live according to this maxim. If they cannot become Number One or Two in an industry, they 
get out from that market and reinvest their resources elsewhere.
26 The Economist, March 26, 2016.
27 See Section 10.4 
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vendor. The situation is similar on the stock market, where brokers buy identical 
“goods” (shares, bonds, foreign currencies, etc.) from other traders. Therefore, 
in such transactions, it is only the price of the particular asset that counts. Every 
actor is a price-taker. To a large extent, this is the way that large manufacturing 
firms functioned in the first half of the 20th century. Workers along the conveyor 
belt were easily replaceable – one worker was just as good as the other – there-
fore, it was once again only their price (i.e. their wage) what mattered. The de-
cision-making model of GET is an accurate description of these types of routine 
decisions. With or without the Walrasian auctioneer, the choices are simple and 
almost instantaneous.
On the other hand, the process of decision-making is entirely different when 
non-recurring, irrevocable decisions are made in private life or in business. When 
people make choices of buying cars in every third or fourth year, deciding to 
purchase a house once or twice in their life, or choose a lifetime marriage partner, 
make a decision on having children, they are driven by considerations which are 
very far from the homo oeconomicus model underlying GET. The same holds in 
business. Large, business-critical investment decisions like building a new plant, 
merging with a major industrial competitor, or investing millions of dollars in a 
new innovation are never based on price information alone, as the representatives 
of GET contend in their argumentation.28 Many decades after AE, this differen-
tiation between recurring and non-recurring decisions has become a triviality as 
a result of the well-publicised results of experimental psychology (Kahneman 
2011), where already the title of the book underscored the same, fundamental dif-
ference: Thinking Fast and Slow. 
6. CONCLUSION
In April 1973, Kaldor opened his lecture at the University of Barcelona with the 
following statement: “My purpose is to explain why I regard prevailing economic 
theories, as taught in the regular textbooks in most universities of the Western 
28 A version of this argument was already used by Kaldor in the paper written against Samuelson 
and Modigliani. The issue debated was the alleged relentless pursuit of the principle of substitution. 
In the spirit of GET, Kaldor for a moment accepted that in the long run, the non-profit maximis-
ers would fall by the wayside as a result of competition. In the next step, however, he rejected this 
argument by saying that “in a world of imperfect foresight and changing technology, the Darwinian 
process may favour the successful innovator who operates on hunches rather than the homo oeco-
nomicus of the more pedestrian type, the careful equator of marginal substitution ratios” Kaldor 
(1966, 1978: 83). Without directly referencing, Kaldor used the “animal spirit” argumentation of 
Keynes in the General Theory (Ch. 12: The State of Long Term Expectations).
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World, as thoroughly misleading and pretty useless” (op.cit.: 273, my italics). 
This is exactly the position Kornai has recently formulated in his memoirs, with 
a certain amount of self-criticism. “It was a mistake to criticise the purity of the 
theory. The neoclassical school should have been targeted. The right addresses of 
my criticism should have been the teaching practice and the research program of 
mainstream economics” (Kornai 2007: 184–185). 
It is probably not an exaggeration to say that Kaldor and Kornai became known 
in the English-speaking scholarly literature as the most significant antagonists 
of GET, while it is also true that they both failed – as well as many others – to 
shepherd the majority of the economic profession into the anti-equilibrium camp. 
Kaldor, like Thomas Balogh and Joan Robinson, with whom he was on a com-
mon wavelength as far as GET was concerned, used to communicate in a polemic 
and outspoken style both in their writings and oral presentations. They all fought 
particularly harshly with the American hegemony in economic theory. By con-
trast, Kornai was more inclusive and pedantically precise in giving credit to other 
authors for any useful points. But this difference did not matter much – Kaldor 
and Kornai achieved much less than they aspired to. As the years passed, their 
works have been slowly forgotten and the young, upcoming generation of econo-
mists does not encounter their names in the general curriculum of MA or PhD 
programmes. Sadly, it is not fashionable today to read books or papers written 
50 or 80 years ago. Is this going to change in the upcoming decades?
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